Here is a way to dismantle the moral argument for God without getting into the subjective vs. objective morality debate.
A more traditional take on the Euthyphro dilemma, a classic problem of the moral argument for God:
If God chooses what is good, does God have a reason for the actions to which he assigns a good value? If so, why can humans not come to the same reason? If not, then someone (God, in this case) arbitrarily assigned good and bad values, which is exactly what theists think is the problem with subjective morality.Modern apologists rarely say God decided anything, rather they claim what is morally good is simply part of God's nature. They expect this negates the dilemma. It doesn't. For this reason I recommend presenting a formation more like below to stay with the times.
If God's nature is good and it could be no other way...who made God's nature as such? If someone made God's nature good, then we should probably worship that God...if only we could know why that God made good what it is. There's a potential infinite regress of moral responsibility here which explains nothing. However, if no one made God's nature good, then it's possible for beings to have good natures without a higher being making them as such. Therefore, the same can apply to us.It's a small distinction that most people should be able to come to on their own, but apologists are highly motivated to not think about how their arguments might fail. We need to show them, repeatedly.
I like it, instead of going the way of "it could have been anything, what if he made murder good?" it says "god's nature is good without someone making it that way, why can't we be good without someone making us that way?"
ReplyDeleteI don't think any theist will accept that it's metaphysically possible for a being that is essentially (that is in the technical term, not colloquial) non-divine to be the standard of objective moral values. This is because there are possible worlds in which humans don't exist; objective moral values are in every possible world; ergo, humans cannot ground objective moral values. QED. Just trying to help!
DeleteCertainly few theists would accept it because it conflicts with what they want to believe, but I know of no evidence for objective moral values indepenant from the social beings who define them. If you have evidence, Randy, I'd be interested.
DeleteNow wait a min, Grundy! ;) Didn't you say, "Here is a way to dismantle the moral argument for God without getting into the subjective vs. objective morality debate."? And yet here we are, led to the subjective vs. objective distinction!
DeleteI think it's important that we keep track of the dialectic. The idea is that the theist will state, in response to the Euthyphro dilemma (which is an objection to belief in God as the ground of objective morality), that neither option holds--it is God's nature that is identical with the good, so that he neither chooses what is objectively good nor is it outside of him. To this, it is responded, "Who chose God's nature?" If the answer is something outside of God, then God isn't really God, as his nature is dictated to him by someone else. If no one made God's nature good, it is claimed that it is possible for beings to have good natures, and therefore it is possible for us as well. My response was that, in context, a "good nature" is for one's nature to be identical with the good as its objective ground. So while one would agree that God's nature was not "made good," but as the objective ground (that exists in all possible worlds) is necessary, Christian theists (and probably most philosophers of any stripe, for what it's worth) would reject that any non-divine being could possess this. This is because non-divine beings, like humans, do not exist in every possible world; there are possible circumstances in which humans do not exist (not just specific humans, but any humans whatsoever). As such, they cannot (neither individually nor jointly) be the ground of objective moral values. To this, you reply that you don't know of any evidence for objective moral values independent from those who define them. Charitably, I'm assuming this means that any evidence of objective moral values seems to be related to human beings, who define what is right and wrong in a descriptive, rather than prescriptive, sense. But notice the dialectic: I can happily agree with you, and the objections to your reformulated dilemma stand unaffected. In fact, atheists could agree with you, having only discussed, counterfactually, what it would be like were God to exist and be the ground of objective moral values, and still concur with my analysis above. I just don't see what the existence of objective moral values has to do with the dialectic outlined above.
Randy, I see your point. I'm changing a line of my post and pointing readers to the comments. The social vs. transcendental morality debate is unavoidable even with the above dilemma. I use the words "social" and "transcendental" instead of "subjective" and "objective" for clarity, because I think that's closer to what we both mean, correct me if I'm wrong.
Delete"Objective" isn't a good word because if we define moral actions as that which causes more benefit to others than harm, then that definition may be applied objectively whether or not all parties accept it and providing that "benefit" and "harm" are clearly defined. You are speaking of transcendental morality which exists whether or not humans, or any non-divine entity for that matter, are available to act upon it. Transcendental morality I simply don't believe in and see no reason to, which brings me back to the question of evidence, which I still don't see any. The dilemma itself still applies, however. The distinction of divine vs. non-divine is an arbitrary one if at least one category exists only in the imagination. Until it is shown that the divine both exists and has properties that exempt it from the dilemma, it's only a red herring.
Speaking of distinctions, there is a distinction between actually dismantling an argument and having all parties accept the reality that it has been dismantled. ;-)
Randy, if God is the standard of goodness, by what means can we know this to be true? So we can ask, why is God good? You might say God is good because he is intrinsically loving, compassionate and fair. But then all we have to do is reformulate the Euthyphro Dilemma accordingly: Is God good because he is loving, compassionate and fair, or is being loving, compassionate and fair good because God is good?
DeleteIf you pick the former, then the attributes God has that make him good exist independently of God and are merely descriptive terms applied to God, if you pick the latter then how can we possibly know that being loving, compassionate and fair is good? It can’t simply be good because God is good, because then the word “good” is meaningless and circular. So how would you answer the reformed Euthyphro?
@Grundy, thanks for the reply. What's interesting is that the objective vs. subjective discussion is the red herring! It also does not matter if only one of these things (divine or non-divine) exists in reality; many atheistic thinkers would gladly agree with me, and they surely think God only exists in the imagination. This distinction isn't arbitrary, it's logically necessary. One being is posited as necessary and the other type of being is, by essence, contingent. Now you may want to say that God doesn't exist after all, which is fine--but now we've moved from an internal critique to an external. The dilemma you posit is an internal critique. It's the type of critique that says, "Even if you are right, X or Y. X or Y have deleterious consequences." External critiques are matters of fact. "Your view is X or Y. X or Y is false or unjustified." I don't like to move on to other discussions until the initial relevant ones are settled, and external critiques are not relevant to internal critiques!
Delete@TheThinker, I say God is good because he *is* the good. His nature is identical to the good. Now the reformulated would be "why is God's nature good?" But the answer to that question is that his nature is necessary (notice also this very dilemma assumes the truth of a modified version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, so one will have to allow the PSR in order to press this objection--just something to think about). You claim it follows we cannot know the good, but notice the switch--the Euthyphro is about moral ontology, and your question is moral epistemology. How we come to know morals is entirely independent as a category from its ontology. That is to say, there are a variety of options here, including rational moral intuition, divine commands, et al. As an internal critique, the revised dilemma commits a category error, conflating ontology with epistemology. I hope that helps! :)
Delete"I say God is good because he *is* the good. His nature is identical to the good."
DeleteTo say god is the good is an unsupported assertion. You have to demonstrate that, otherwise you're just playing word games. Anyone can make up a deity and claim that it is the source of all goodness. Muslims do this, Mormons do this, and their gods are different.
"Now the reformulated would be "why is God's nature good?""
Sorry, you haven't yet established that god is good, you've asserted it. Try again.
"But the answer to that question is that his nature is necessary"
Even if I grant you this - that goodness is an essential property of god, it is a property that can apply to other things independently of god’s existence. Just think of how being hot is an essential property of fire – fire must be hot, it cannot be cold. But “hot” can apply to many other things independently of fire. For example, microwaves cause things to be hot and so does friction.
"(notice also this very dilemma assumes the truth of a modified version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, so one will have to allow the PSR in order to press this objection--just something to think about). "
When we're dealing with a being that is said to be devoid of brute facts then I do expect reasons to be given for all its properties. But that doesn't mean I have to accept the PSR in totality. The PSR itself doesn't have any reasons to support it that don't involve assuming it first.
"You claim it follows we cannot know the good..."
Not at all. I never claimed we cannot know the good.
"How we come to know morals is entirely independent as a category from its ontology."
I'm perfectly well aware of the difference between moral ontology and epistemology. My question is indeed an epistemic question, but in order to answer why being loving, compassionate and fair are good, you will have to give an explanation why they are good with out making a circular argument. So far you've just made an unsupported assertion that anyone with an imaginary god can make.
You've lost track of the dialectic. The Euthyphro dilemma is an internal critique; it's not an external or de facto critique. The whole point is to claim that God cannot be the foundations of objective morality, for if he were, then he either commands morality or his commands conform to the morality, with the former horn meaning morality is arbitrary and the latter meaning morality is outside of God. The solution is to show the dilemma is false by introducing a third option. It's up to the one who pushes the dilemma to show that this is not possible (or, at least, not what truly takes place--though I'm not sure how this could be done without some other argument doing all the work). Next, you've misunderstood the claim about the necessity of God's nature. While it's true that God's nature is necessary, the main answer to the dilemma is that God's nature is identical to the good. That cannot be the case on any contingent being, by definition. You most assuredly do think, on this internal critique, that moral knowledge is impossible. Either you are a liar or incapable of understanding basic logical arguments. Your pick. I'll quote you: "if you pick the latter then how can we possibly know that being loving, compassionate and fair is good? It can’t simply be good because God is good, because then the word “good” is meaningless and circular." You think it's not even possible.
DeleteAnd no, citing objective moral values as necessary is definitional. Your question is akin to asking "Why, on the definition of X, should X be defined as X?" Uh, because it is defined that way. You have forgotten the dialectic, and that the entire thing is an internal critique. I honestly tire of atheists pretending to be intellectually superior when they wouldn't pass a sophomore-level philosophy class. I'm done with you unless or until you're ready to be honest. Well, or until you become able to deal with the arguments. That at least gives you the benefit of the doubt.
Don’t get so hung up on internal vs. external critiques. My reformulation is an external critique. It establishes the independent nature of objective morality.
Delete”The Euthyphro dilemma is an internal critique; it's not an external or de facto critique. The whole point is to claim that God cannot be the foundations of objective morality, for if he were, then he either commands morality or his commands conform to the morality, with the former horn meaning morality is arbitrary and the latter meaning morality is outside of God. The solution is to show the dilemma is false by introducing a third option.”
My point is that there is no third option and that the god is not the foundation of objective morality. The most common response to the Euthyphro Dilemma is that god is good, as is evident from your position. This is an ontological claim (that is simply asserted). Once this response is given all I have to do now is reformat the Euthyphro accordingly. So I asked, “Is God good because he is loving, compassionate and fair, or is being loving, compassionate and fair good because God is good?” There has to be a reason why we call something, like compassion, good. So what characteristic comes first – god’s goodness, or his being loving, compassionate and fair? The theist is in a squirm here. You cannot simply define god as being “good” without justification. Goodness has to be justified descriptively. But if those descriptions are warranted, then they imply goodness for epistemological and ontological reasons that are verifiable due to their intentions and effects. And thus the source of goodness would exist ontologically independently of god.
To illustrate, let me quote you Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Georgetown University Jeremy Koon’s paper, “CAN GOD’S GOODNESS SAVE THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY FROM EUTHYPHRO?”
”But as we have seen, since Adams and Alston are forced to make the goodness of God logically prior to any of the traits that might plausibly constitute God’s goodness, it is not at all clear what is meant by the claim that God is the standard of goodness, for the simple reason that it is not clear what is meant by the claim that God is good. To make any sense of the claim that God is good, the traits constitutive of goodness (such as being loving) must be good prior to God’s goodness: it must be the case that God is good because he is loving, and not the case that being loving is good because God is loving. But this requires a repudiation of the particularism that is at the heart of views like Adams’ and Alston’s. This would also require a standard of moral goodness that is independent of God’s nature. One could make it dependent on God’s will or commandments or decisions, but of course that throws us back in the original arbitrariness problem. Thus, it seems as though an adequate solution to the Euthyphro problem requires that God be constrained by standards of moral goodness that are external to Himself. Perhaps this creates problems for divine sovereignty and the like, but that is separate problem.”
”While it's true that God's nature is necessary, the main answer to the dilemma is that God's nature is identical to the good. That cannot be the case on any contingent being, by definition.”
How do you know “the good” is not really just contingently good for us homo sapiens? How is it that you establish there’s a platonic “good” out there? And what metric are you using to gauge the good in assessing it?
”You most assuredly do think, on this internal critique, that moral knowledge is impossible. Either you are a liar or incapable of understanding basic logical arguments. Your pick.”
DeleteYou’ve perhaps misunderstood me, or I didn’t make myself clear in the context of the quote. Let me establish my position. Moral knowledge is epistemically available to us, and it’s epistemic and ontological foundations exist independently of god. Once having discovered what is good for us, we simply just give god those traits and assert he is their source. It’s like turning god into an emotion or a feeling. When I asked, “how can we possibly know that being loving, compassionate and fair is good?” it was asked conditionally under second horn of the dilemma - the assumption being loving, compassionate and fair are good because God is good. Given that assumption, which I don’t hold to, it would be impossible to establish why those traits would be good. They would be good because god is good, which is absurd. You would never accept that murder is good because god is a murderer and he is good, right? So why should I accept that with love or compassion? The reason why, is that in order to establish something is actually good, it has to be justified for reasons that will force you to establish its goodness independently of god.
The logic of your argument goes outside of morality. It appeals to existence itself. To have a nature requires existence. The greater question is still whether or not we can exist apart from a creator.
DeleteIs God the uncaused cause (the creator) of the Universe and of our nature and our existence? If no one made God there is no need to explain where his nature came from. Christians believe (logically and rationally) that no one created God. We don't need to explain where his nature came from.
The greater question is whether god can exist apart from us, because I think god is completely contingent - on us. We made god(s) in our own image.
DeleteIf you don't need to explain where his nature came from, then you cannot claim that the positive attributes commonly associated with him cannot exist independently of him, which in some ways, was my whole point.
I am becoming more and more a hater with respect to philosophical arguments. I mean I can justify so many things using philosophy and for me that is the essence of the problem. I wish, I could just see evidence for this God, but then again I am sure I am not alone in that. I think apologists are all looking and living in philosophical denial.
ReplyDeleteThat whole thing is either a budding philosophical argument or just a bare assertion. Think about it: how will you justify these conclusions without philosophical argument?
DeleteI understand your point, but I feel if you are using a philosophical argument it should be based on something. A great example is the double slit experiment,which has various philosophical implications of position versus outcome.But the beauty is that these philosophical arguments are still based on observation they are just trying to fill in the gaps until we can understand the gaps. In theology we are not starting at an observation but just looking to fill gaps that don’t need filling until we understand what the beginning is.
DeleteBut even the argument that philosophical arguments should be based on empiricism is an argument that cannot be justified using empiricism (at least in a non-question-begging way, anyway).
DeleteWell only if you refuse to believe what is happening is actually happening. I mean if an event A gives X 100% of the time,the only way to deny this would be to say that X is actually an artefact of something else C, while A doesn't really exist. This argument may seem sound,but in essence it makes sense rather to say event A leads to X.
DeleteOverall, the smugness of this blog would be hilarious if it weren't so sad. Even a detailed reading of atheistic philosophers would help you. That's all I can think to suggest. BTW, the modified PSR won't itself need an explanation so long as you don't take it to be a being (instead a mere proposition). The anti-intellectual, self-congratulatory, head-in-the-sand atheism that is perpetuated here is what, generally, causes me to focus my energy on developing deeper and more consistent ways of thinking, instead of being mired in the philosophical equivalent of first grade.
ReplyDeleteYour smug, self-congratulatory dismissal is duly noted. ;-) If the philosophies found here are inferior to that of the atheistic philosophers you speak of, perhaps you should consider them more closely.
DeleteAs you know, I read your blog from time to time. I think an interesting topic for you to cover would be the evidence you find compelling for morality existing outside social creatures ability to define and act upon it. I have yet to hear anything other than claims that project personal feelings to generalized humanity to support objective morality, and even if those claims could be shown to be valid, they would still be lacking as an explanation for the transcendental morality you speak of.